Changing Course: A New Approach In Iraq

There is general agreement that "the consequences of failure in Iraq would be unthinkable," as President Bush put it in his April 13 press conference. Yet success appears increasingly uncertain. And as the unthinkable becomes more plausible, there is a striking paucity of proposals for alternative approaches.

I don't know whether the present course can assure success. But if President Bush is correct that the perpetrators of the violence represent a minority of extremists seeking to "destroy the democratic hopes of the Iraqi people," and if there is a substantial risk that they will succeed, then the situation points directly to a distinct alteration of course: a temporary suspension of freedoms, and the imposition of martial law. This is the appropriate response to disorder and anarchy that threaten the civil framework of society, in Iraq no less than it would be in the U.S. itself.

Martial law, efficiently administered and supported by computerized tracking of every individual on Iraqi soil, could bring civil authorities such decided advantages that the insurgency would effectively be finished.

I do not propose that martial law be peremptorily imposed upon the Iraqi people, but that it be offered to them as part of a credible plan to install democratic institutions.

Since a referendum is impractical under current conditions, the plan should be put to some substantial number of representative Iraqis, and their responses gathered and publicized by independent monitors.

The other elements of the proposed plan would spell out how authorities would take advantage of the stabilized environment to foster rapid democratization: providing communications infrastructure, helping bring forward Iraqi leadership aspirants, establishing forums for political discussion, and helping conduct neutral inquiries that would publicly report on the people's needs, priorities, and viewpoints.

Who could be charged with the execution of such a plan? The U.S.? The U.N.?

Credibility is essential, but the under-appreciated qualities of managerial and technical competence are at least as vital. What's needed is an organization that is not hobbled by the many deficiencies recent investigations have exposed in U.S. agencies such as the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. -- an organization that is capable of internal communication; whose managers are able to listen to knowledgeable subordinates; where there is openness, willingness to face issues, and shared purpose; where real rewards for whistle-blowers give firmer credence to stated objectives; and where there is sufficient competence to set up working computer systems.

Modern technology presents an awesome ability to monitor entire populations. This capability can promote security, but also makes feasible an unprecedented degree of subjugation and control. Throughout the period of martial law, freedom of political speech must be upheld (with well-defined exceptions for hate promotion and incitement to violence) -- and this includes access to Iraqi media for the full spectrum of political expression.

The idea of martial law coupled with high-tech tracking of all citizens' movements inevitably produces knee-jerk objections involving the wounded pride of Iraqis and their resentment of foreign occupiers. But this stereotype should not displace the rational Iraqi who sees his hopes for a peaceful and democratic future threatened by violent extremists.

If the majority of Iraqis indeed wish to achieve democracy, as President Bush says, then they might be expected to endorse the idea that civil order is a prerequisite to freedom and the introduction of democratic institutions. Meeting this prerequisite should be the immediate goal, for their sake and ours.